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Summary
Designing optimal interdependent networks is important
for the robustness and efficiency of national critical infras-
tructures. Here, we establish a two-person game-theoretic
model in which two network designers choose to maximize
the global connectivity independently. This framework
enables decentralized network design by using iterative
algorithms. After a finite number of steps, the algorithm
will converge to a Nash equilibrium, and yields the equilib-
rium topology of the network. We corroborate our results
by using numerical experiments, and compare the Nash
equilibrium solutions with their team solution counter-
parts. The experimental results of the game method and
the team method provide design guidelines to increase the
efficiency of the interdependent network formation games.
Moreover, the proposed game framework can be gener-
ally applied to a diverse number of applications, including
power system networks and international air transporta-
tion networks.
Introduction
Algebraic connectivity plays an important role on the
speed of information spreading, synchronization and re-
silience to attacks in networks [1, 2]. Despite a significant
number of works on network connectivity maximization,
they have mainly focused on one single network. However,
complex systems often consist of multiple networks each
controlling themselves. The methodologies from previous
studies may not be directly used to address such kind of
network connectivity maximization problems. This moti-
vates us to develop new tools for interdependent networks.
In this work, we use games to establish models and sign
principles for interdependent networks. It has significant
advantages over centralized methods when the network
is large or composed of several interacting subnetworks.
Our problem considers a global network G composed of
two interdependent networks, G1 and G2. The network
designer of each subnetwork is seen as a player of the in-
terdependent network formation games. Each player Pi,
i ∈ {1, 2}, can add or delete interlinks in Gi and intra-
links between G1 and G2, while subjecting to budget and
link constraints. Adding a link to G incurs a cost. P1
and P2 independently update the network in an alternat-
ing fashion by maximizing algebraic connectivity of G at
each step. At each round of the update, one player’s op-
timal strategy is the best response to the strategy of the
other player from the previous round. To be specific, we
define Ai,k and Di,k as the set of links that Pi can add
or delete at step k. L−i,k−1, where −i , {1, 2} \ {i},
is the Laplacian matrix of G obtained from the previ-
ous step after player −i has chosen his network topology.
xe, x
′
e ∈ {0, 1} are decision variables of adding and re-
moving links, respectively. Here, 1 means that link e is
selected into G, while 0 means otherwise. xi,k is a vector
of length |Ai,k| that consists of all xe and x
′
i,k is a vector
of length |Di,k| that consists of all x
′
e. xi is a column
vector that denotes the state of all links that Pi can form
in G. ci is a vector with the same size of xi whose en-
tries are the costs of corresponding links. Mi and ki are
the budget and link constraint for Pi, respectively. λ2(L)
gives the second smallest eigenvalue of matrix L. Then,
the general problem for Pi at step k can be formulated as
max
xi,k, x
′
i,k
λ2(L−i,k−1 +
|Ai,k|∑
e=1
xeaea
T
e −
|Di,k|∑
e=1
x′eded
T
e )
s.t.
|Ai,k|∑
e=1
xe =
|Di,k|∑
e=1
x′e,
cTi xi ≤Mi, 1
Txi = ki,
xi,k ∈ {0, 1}
|Ai,k| , x′i,k ∈ {0, 1}
|Di,k| .
(1)
For comparison, we define a team problem where P1
and P2 cooperatively form the interdependent network.
Main Results
Problem (1) can be reformulated into a simpler equiva-
lent problem, where Pi removes all links he has formed at
previous step first, then starts from scratch and forms an-
other ki links. Since each player chooses a set of links in
the network, the game is a binary game problem (BGP).
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Figure 1: Connected links in (a) are the result of a case
when k1 = k2 = 7 and with greedy algorithm. Results of
all steps in (b) are based on the model in (a) with k1 = k2.
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(b) Performance of GM and TM
Figure 2: (a) gives a model of two PSNs. (b) shows the
performance of GM and TM based on the PSN in (a).
By relaxing the binary action set, we can transform BGP
into a relaxed game problem (RGP), which is a semidef-
inite programming (SDP) problem. RGP is more conve-
nient to solve than BGP. However, if the optimal solution
of RGP is not feasible for BGP, then it should be rounded.
Here, we consider three rounding techniques, i.e., greedy,
link-by-link and log link-by-link. The difference between
them is the number of elements chosen from the solution
of RGP to round at each iteration. The performance of
each algorithm of a case study is shown in Fig. 1. G1
and G2 in Fig. 1(a) are symmetric, and both contain 4
nodes. Clearly, λ2 of RGP is an upper bound for the
optimal solution of BGP with rounding. In terms of com-
putation time and optimality, greedy algorithm yields the
best result. All curves in Fig. 1(b) are lower bounded by
8 corresponding to the completely connected network.
We compare the performance of game model (GM) and
team model (TM) via a numerical example of interdepen-
dent power system networks (PSN). The network model
is shown in Fig. 2(a). A and B have 5 and 4 substa-
tions, respectively, and k1 = 6 and k2 = 4 in the exist-
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Figure 3: (a) and (b) are the impact of number of PL and
substation on network connectivity respectively.
ing network. Each power line (PL) has a cost related
to the power transmission loss. Based on this network,
both game model and team model are used to design the
PSN. As shown in Fig. 2(b), the connectivity of team
network is better than that of the Nash equilibrium (NE)
network, and after 5 steps, NE network reaches an equi-
librium. Loss of connectivity (LOC), which measures the
gap between the two solutions, is 4.6%.
To obtain more general results, we focus on the impact
of the number of PL and substations, respectively. In the
first case, we relax the constraint on budget, and assume
k1 = k2. In the second case, the budget is fixed, and
the number of substations in both networks is increased
by one at every step. We assume the cost of each PL
is the same (ideal PL), which leads to fixed k1 and k2.
Simulation results of these two cases are shown in Fig. 3.
At k1 = 9, 10, 11 in Fig. 3(a), LOCs are equal to 32.3%,
34.8% and 33.8%, respectively, higher than those of other
steps. Therefore, the team solution has a better perfor-
mance over the game solution in these cases. However,
when k1 and k2 are greater than 14 or smaller than 7 in
this case, there is no sizable difference between noncooper-
ative and cooperative PSN formations. GM is preferable
for these two regions in terms of reduced complexity and
information security since players need not to share bud-
get information. Fig. 3(b) provides design insights that
cooperative PSN is better when a moderate number of
substations are added to the network.
References
[1] P.-Y. Chen and A. O. Hero. Assessing and safeguarding net-
work resilience to centrality attacks. IEEE Communications
Magazine, 52(11):138–143, 2014.
[2] J. Mart´ın-Herna´ndez, H. Wang, P. Van Mieghem, and
G. DAgostino. Algebraic connectivity of interdependent net-
works. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications,
404:92–105, 2014.
2
